Ray, yeah, I’m quite murky about this notion of intelligences” and exactly what they consist of.

fMhLisa, that’s great! I’m quite amused to hear that I’m not the only one to have considered a stuffed animal transmigration–though I’m not surprised it was unsuccessful.

Fideline, ha! I’d forgotten about that. (I suppose it’s good they didn’t try to charge Juliana rent!) And I’m also interested in that relationship between the self and social roles. Are we ever not playing a role, I wonder? What would it mean to talk about a self that’s distinct from its roles?

This incident perhaps leads to a another question about self. How much of “self” is purely presentation driven by a need to conform to social expectations for different situations? Is it possible to see ourselves and others beyond the social roles that we play or masks that we wear?

If you include the concept of intelligences, I have no idea.

Why might I consider myself accountable for actions done by an earlier version of myself?

Yes, this question is one that has interested me for the longest time. I have come to the conclusion that we are only accountable for our current selves and that the talk of being accountable for our past selves is only true in the sense that our past actions have made us who we are today. I’ve argued this point at various times in the past, but this comment was the only one I could dig up.

And the questions get even trickier once we’re talking about premortal and postmortal existence. What is the “me” that remains constant through all those spheres?

This one is quite a doozy. I wonder about that too.

Jacob J, that’s a good point about the difference between a person and an inanimate object–I’m thinking that the latter can be reduced to its physicality in a way that a person probably can’t. I’m trying to think this out, because I agree with you that it’s not hard to imagine a person’s identity remaining constant even in the face of serious changes to their body. At the same time, I think there’s something flawed in the kind of premise you see on Star Trek, in which someone’s consciousness can get transferred into someone else’s body and yet remain “them”. Maybe the former seems more plausible to me because there’s still some kind of physical continuity, and because it doesn’t raise the problems of dualism.

So perhaps the question I’m getting at here is–does the Resurrection give me a body which has some connection to the one I have now–perhaps along the lines of the acorn/tree or caterpillar/butterfly analogies–or does it put my consciousness into something entirely new, more along the lines of Star Trek? And I suppose a related problem is that of what continuity exists between who I am now and my disembodied spirit self said to exist in the next life before the Resurrection.

And RT, that’s quite the image of the Resurrection and its use of recycled material–I may never think of it the same way again!

Angie, that doesn’t sound bad! I do like the idea of a resurrected body free from the many physical ailments that plague us in this life. It would also be cool if, like in Defending Your Life (I think), you could eat unlimited chocolate and so forth without gaining weight.

Zillah, I have to agree with you about Melyngoch. Fortunately, Juliana is safe from her for the time being, while she’s off inflicting her devious ways on the poor souls in Sweden.

The picture of “Juliana models her Angel sweater while studying her scriptures” is priceless.

As to the topic of bodies and identity, it seems that you may be exacerbating the problem by considering it in the context of a stuffed animal, where the only thing it has to define itself is its appearance. Consider, for a counter example, whether you would be able to “transmigrate” the soul of your family member from their current body to one that is disfigured by accident or fire. I think you’ll have a much easier time with that than with your stuffed animal because a person’s identity is so much deeper than their skin.